Mroso J: This is an appeal against a conviction and sentence by the District Court of Moshi in Traffic Criminal case No 288/92. The appellant is shown to have pleaded guilty to a charge of causing bodily G injury through reckless driving, contrary to ss 42(1)(a), 63(2)(b) and 27(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, No 30 of 1973. He was convicted on the plea of guilty and sentenced to a fine of shillings 10,000/= or 12 months' imprisonment in default. He was also disqualified from holding or obtaining a H driving license for a period of three years. His appeal is based mainly on the complaint that the plea of guilty was equivocal.
At the hearing of this appeal the learned State Attorney for the respondent Republic did not seek to support the conviction. He conceded that the plea of guilty was equivocal, I proceeded to I
A allow the appeal by quashing the conviction and setting aside both the sentence and the disqualification order. I ordered that the fine if already paid be refunded to him. The case was remitted to the lower court with a direction that a plea of not guilty be entered against the appellant and the case to proceed to hearing.
B There is no doubt that the plea of guilty by the appellant was equivocal. The particulars in the charge sheet read:
`That Keneth s/o Manda charged on the 15th day of October 1992 at about 15:35 hrs along Himo Road within the C Municipality of Moshi Kilimanjaro Region being the driver of motor vehicle Reg No 95843 make Toyota Coaster PSV did drive the said motor vehicle on the said road recklessly. To wit he failed to control well the said motor vehicle as the result went off the road and overturned thereby caused bodily injuries to Aisia d/o Nichola and Regina d/o Phillipo who were passengers in the said motor vehicle.'
D The appellant accepted these particulars as true. The Court entered a plea of guilty following that plea. When the prosecution was called upon to give the facts of the case he said:
E `On 15/10/92 at about 3:35 along Himo Road In Moshi Town, accused was driving a motor vehicle registration number TZ 95843, a mini bus for carrying passengers. He was driving from Himo towards Moshi Municipality. Accused failed to control the motor vehicle as such it overturned and injured two passengers namely Asia Nichola F and Regina Phillipo. I produce PF3 in respect of the injured people as exhibits.'
After the exhibits were tendered the appellant said the facts were correct. The court then proceeded G to convict him on his own plea of guilty.
As is obvious, there was nothing said either in the particulars of the offence or in the facts as given by the public prosecutor which suggested reckless driving apart from the bare assertion that the appellant failed to control well (sic) the motor vehicle he was driving and that consequently it H overturned. Now, to fail to control a motor vehicle one is driving can be as a result of either careless or reckless driving or because of a factor for which the driver is not personally responsible. The appellant, belatedly perhaps, explained that his failure to control the motor vehicle was because a main leaf has broken. That might have been true. Incidentally, it is curious the prosecutor did not I tender to court a vehicle inspection report, if it
existed, to show the condition of the motor vehicle before and after the accident. A
If, as claimed by the appellant, the failure to control the motor vehicle resulted from the broken main leaf, he would not be blamed for the overturning of the motor vehicle and the resultant injuries to Bpassengers. Furthermore, admission by the appellant of the particulars of the offence and the facts narrated by the prosecutor as correct was non-committal and innocuous. It by no means suggested he was pleading guilty to the offence charged, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter was being invoked. That is to say, that the mere fact that the motor vehicle overturned and passengers were C injured that meant the appellant had been reckless. But, as has often been stated by this court, the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter has no application in criminal law.
An accused person can only be convicted on his own plea of guilty if his plea is unequivocal. That is, where it is ascertained that he has accepted as correct facts which constitute all the ingredients of D the offence. That was not the case here. As already said, no particulars or facts constituting the offence of reckless driving were put to the appellant. So, the plea by the appellant was equivocal and the court ought to have entered a plea of not guilty and required the prosecution to adduce evidence E in proof of the offence charged.
The lower court should comply with the directions of this court as already given in this judgment.
A
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