Mwaikasu J: By this appeal, the appellant, one Shabani Mpiri, challenges the decision of the Housing Appeals Tribunal in its Appeal No 46 of 1992, originating from the Dar es Salaam Regional Housing BTribunal Application No 317 of 1991. In its decision the Housing Appeals Tribunal reversed the decision of the Regional Housing Tribunal which ordered the eviction of the respondent, one Wilbarda Tairo, from the appellant's house by unanimously holding that the respondent, having been C the wife of the deceased one Tairo who was the appellant's tenant and lived with him in such house until the day of his death, was, upon the death of her husband, a statutory tenant as defined under s 3(1) of the Rent Restriction Act 1984, and therefore as such, a protected tenant under the provision of s 25(1)(a)(i) of the said Act, so that there was no need for her to enter a new tenancy D agreement with the appellant.
That could not sound just and reasonable to the appellant who is on record to have maintained before not only the lower appellate tribunal but before this court that the respondent ought to have entered a new tenancy agreement after the death of her husband, and that if there was such a law E that did provide such a protection as relied upon by the respondent, then he would not recognize such law, adding that if there was a law that required him in the circumstances of this case to provide an alternative accommodation to such a widow if she is to be evicted, when such law, as it did not come from God, he would not recognise it either. F
It is such ostrich mindedness of the appellant that has led him to challenge such decision of the Housing Appeals Tribunal before this Court, arguing, in the main that the Housing Appeals Tribunal G had erred in law by so holding that the respondent was under the Rent Restriction Act 1984, automatically a protected tenant and that there was no necessity for her to enter a new tenancy agreement with him, the landlord. On the other ground that the Housing Appeals Tribunal did not adequately consider the allegation that the respondent had been guilty of contravening tenancy rules H for her alleged refusal to clean the backyard of the suit premises, that, in my view, was adequately considered by the lower appellate Tribunal. This court does not therefore, intend to address itself on the issue.
Now coming to the only legal issue raised in this appeal, which is whether under the provisions of s I 3(1) and s 25(1)(e)(i) of the Rent
A Restriction Act 1984, the respondent, upon the death of her husband who was then the tenant of theB appellant and with whom the respondent used to live as husband and wife in the appellant's house until the day of his death, thereafter automatically became a protected tenant.
B Upon reading the definition of the word `Tenant' as provided for under s 3(1) of the Rent Restriction Act 1984 together with s 25(1)(e)(i) of the said Act, I am satisfied that this appeal has no substance. Under the law, the respondent is clearly as found by the Housing Appeals Tribunal, a protected tenant. Any attempt to evict her from the premises must comply with the provisions of s 25(1)(e)(i) regarding the provision of suitable alternative accommodation by the landlord. If the C appellant considers such provision of our law to be unjust, the only reasonable course for him to take is either to raise such complaint with his Honourable Member of Parliament, with a view of soliciting D the desired amendment or forward his memo with the law Reform Commission of Tanzania to have it looked into with a view of reforming it, if found to be so desirable. Otherwise he cannot stand in the way of the operation of the law. He may do so at his own peril.
E Accordingly I dismiss this appeal with costs.
F
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