Nyalali CJ: The following matters are not seriously disputed between the parties in this F case. The nine appellants, namely, Hatibu Gandhi alias Captain Hatty Macghee; Captain Christopher Kadego alias Chriss; Lieutenant Eugene Maganga; Captain Metusela Suleiman Kamando; Captain Vitalis Gabriel Mpunda; Captain Rodrick Roushan Roberts; Captain Dietrich Oswald Mbogoro; Captain Zacharia Hanspoppe and P3794 G Lieutenant Badru Rwechungura Kajaja, hereinafter called first appellant, second appellant, third appellant, fourth appellant, fifth appellant, sixth appellant, seventh appellant, eighth appellant and ninth appellant respectively, were jointly with ten others on three counts of treason, contrary to s 39(2)(a) of the Penal Code, and with one H alternative count of misprision of treason, contrary to s 41(b) of the Penal Code.
At the close of the prosecution case five of the accused persons were found to have no case to answer and were accordingly acquitted. The trial then proceeded with the remaining fourteen accused. I
The trial of this case took about a year to conclude. The prosecu-
tion called a total of ninety-seven prosecution witnesses, whereas the defence called A forty-three witnesses including the accused persons, all of whom with the exception of the eighth appellant, elected to give unsworn statements in their defence. The first appellant elected to say nothing but called one defence witness. At the end of the long B trial, only the present nine appellants were convicted on the three counts of treason in respect of certain specified overt acts and were each sentenced to imprisonment for life.
The remaining five accused persons were acquitted both on the substantive charges and the one in the alternative. As to the appellants who were convicted on the C substantive counts, the learned Jaji Kiongozi properly did not make a finding in respect of the alternative count of misprision.
For purposes of this appeal, the proceedings were compiled in fifteen volumes of stenographers' records, and four volumes of the Trial Judge's notes. It was a job well D done both by the learned trial Jaji Kiongozi and the court stenographers led by Mr John Luanda from the Court of Appeal Registry.
The nine appellants were aggrieved by the convictions and sentences, hence this appeal to this Court. Mr Lakha, learned advocate, appeared for the first, second and third E appellants; whereas Mr Kashumbugu, learned advocate appeared for the fourth, fifth and sixth appellants. Mr Jedeja, learned advocate, represented the seventh and ninth appellants; whereas Mr Mbuya, learned advocate, appeared for the eighth appellant. Messrs Mwanyika and Massaba, Principal State Attorneys, assisted by Miss Korosso, F State Attorney, appeared for the Republic. A total of seventy-three substantive grounds of appeal were submitted against the judgment of the High Court. The hearing of the appeal took seventeen days and at the end of the appeal we reserved our considered judgment until now.
For reasons that will become apparent in this judgment, this case has an economic G background. The global economic crisis which still exists in the world today started many years ago. As it is well known, there is hardly any country in the world which has not, in one way or the other, suffered from this adverse global economic effect. But the year 1982 was a particularly bad one for Tanzania. Most people in the country were H affected by the economic situation. Faced with such economic adversity, there were those who reacted constructively, and others who reacted destructively. By early 1983 the Government had enacted a draconian legislation known as The Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act 1983, to combat a tide of economic crimes. I
A At the time when the country was facing this economic crisis in 1982, the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth appellants held military commissions in the Tanzania Peoples' Defence Forces, that is TPDF. At the time material to this case in 1982, the second appellant was stationed in a tank unit in Dar es Salaam, whereas the B third appellant was pursuing higher studies at Dar es Salaam University. He was in his final year reading for a BA degree in Political Science. The fourth appellant was a pilot in the TPDF Airwing at Ukonga in Dar es Salaam, and so were the fifth and sixth appellants. As far as the seventh appellant is concerned, he was in the Air Defence C Regiment and was in charge of Battery No 2 in Dar es Salaam; similarly, the eighth appellant was in the same regiment as Chief Engineer. As for the ninth appellant, he happened to be stationed in a military unit at Nachingwea, but was in Dar es Salaam in December 1982. All appellants are Tanzanians by nationality.
D Thereafter, during the same month of December 1982, the first appellant and the fourth appellant visited Zanzibar on several occasions. At about this time the first appellant received a number of guests at house No 80B Drive-In. He, and a number of friends, also used to visit a house at Kinondoni Mkwajuni, that is, house No 65--32P E along Livingstone Street in Dar es Salaam, where he and his friends used to have lunch and indulge in heavy drinking. That house belonged to PW38, that is, Zahara Abdulla Sengumba, who rented it from the National Housing Corporation. She was in some way related to the first appellant. She had agreed to allow the first appellant and his friends to F have their lunch there as and when they wished. For most of the time, material to this case, the first appellant travelled in the city by taxi which he hired from PW1, that is, Abdallah Mhando. Towards the end of December 1982, the first appellant hired another taxi driven by PW45, that is, Nassor Sultan Seif, apparently because PW1 had travelled G outside the country to Harare in Zimbabwe.
During this time, Pius Lugangira alias Father Tom was not sitting idly by at Motel Agip, but made a number of contacts in the city, including a visit to house No 1127 Chole H Road at Masaki in Dar es Salaam. That house belonged to one Christopher Paschal Ngaiza, who was one of the persons jointly charged with the appellants but was acquitted after a full trial. This Christopher Paschal Ngaiza happened to be a relative of the said Pius Lugangira alias Father Tom. Towards the end of December 1982, the said I Pius Lugangira invited a number of people to a meeting at house No 1127 along Chole Road at Masaki in Dar es Salaam on two con-
secutive days. The meeting was claimed to be a business meeting and was held while A the owner of the house was away from Dar es Salaam.
On 6 January 1983 events took a dramatic and serious turn. A decision by the authorities was made to launch a joint exercise of the Military, Police and the National Security Department to arrest a number of persons suspected of plotting to overthrow B the Government of the United Republic and kill its President. In the course of that exercise, Mohamed Tamim alias Martin Tamim was shot dead by a national security man as he attempted to avoid arrest at Kinondoni Mkwajuni. Subsequently, various persons, both military and civilian were arrested in the joint exercise. The first and C seventh appellants were arrested on 7 January 1983 at Kinondoni Mkwajuni; whereas the fourth appellant was arrested the following day on 8 January 1983, also in the area of Kinondoni Mkwajuni. The fifth, sixth and eighth appellants were arrested in their homes during the night of 7/8 January 1983. The ninth appellant was also arrested in Dar es D Salaam about that time in January 1983. A search for the second and third appellants was made but neither of them was to be seen anywhere in the country until they were retrieved from Kenya in October 1983. Subsequent to the arrests, the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth appellants, while in police custody, were interrogated by the E police. Later the first, fifth, sixth and seventh appellants were taken before magistrates to whom they made extra-judicial statements. There was, however, a delay in instituting prosecution in a court of law apparently because a number of important suspects F managed to escape from Keko Remand Prison. The case got off the ground after some of the escapees had been retrieved from Kenya sometime in October 1983. That is as far as the matters which are not seriously in dispute in this case are concerned.
We now turn to matters that are seriously in dispute in this case. It is the prosecution G case that before the first appellant and the late Mohamed Tamimu alias Martin Tamimu, as well as Pius Lugangira alias Father Tom entered the country from abroad between mid-November 1982 and mid-December 1982, they were involved in conceiving and hatching up a plot to overthrow the Government of the United Republic, kill its President H and install their own form of Government upon the belief that the Government then in existence had mismanaged the national economy. They hoped that their own government would provide a cure to the economic problems facing the country. The plot so conceived and hatched up required participation of some elements of the TPDF as I well as some civilians.
A The conspiracy to kill the President of the United Republic constituted the first overt act charged in Count 1. The thrust of the conspiracy which was directed at deposing the President from his lawful office, constituted another separate overt act as stated in Count 2, whereas that part of the conspiracy which was derived at overthrowing the B lawful Government of the United Republic constituted another overt act stated in Count 3. It is part of the prosecution case that the first appellant assisted or facilitated the entry of the late Mohamed Tamimu alias Martin Tamimu from Kenya to Dar es Salaam. This conduct is listed as the second overt act in Count 3. C
Furthermore, the prosecution contends that after the trio had entered the country, they began to approach and recruit persons into their plot. A number of those approached and recruited were elements in the TPDF. Some of them succumbed to the plot, but D there were others who refused outright; whereas some pretended to cooperate with the plotters while reporting the matter to the authorities. Among those who were successfully recruited were the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth appellants. PW46, that is, Captain Mohamed Suleiman Mape of the Navy Unit E refused outright. However, he did not report the matter to the authorities. PW11, that is, Captain Albert Ballati of the Commando Unit pretended to go along while reporting to the authorities. This aspect of recruitment of Captain Ballati constituted the seventh overt act charged in Count 3. The successful recruitment of the fifth appellant and the seventh F appellant constituted overt acts numbers 8 and 9 charged in Count 3. PW8, that is, Staff Sergeant Boniface Temu was another military officer who pretended to go along while reporting to the authorities. His recruitment, into the plot constituted the fourteenth overt act charged in Count 3.
G It is part of the prosecution case that the plotters managed to hold a number of conspiratorial meetings to work out the modalities and details of their plot. Some of these took place at house No 80B Drive-In, while others took place at house No 1127 along Chole Road at Masaki, and at a house at Kinondoni Makaburini. The operations H plan of the coup plot was finalised at the last two meetings held at the Chole Road house and a house at Kinondoni Makaburini, between the end of December 1982 and the beginning at January 1983.
The prosecution further contends that some of the conspirators either deliberately or I unwittingly let the cat out of the bag, so to speak, by making incriminating declarations or remarks to friends
and acquaintances in unguarded moments. Instances of such behaviour were the A disclosures made by the first appellant to PW1, that is, Abdallah Mhando in the course of the first appellant being driven in PW1's taxi in the city. Similarly, the second applicant revealed the lot to PW2, that is, Iddi Mushi Stambuli when the two met in a bar house in B Arusha about the middle of December 1982. Also, the ninth appellant revealed the plot to PW3, that is Lieutenant Augustine Pancras Ndejembi when the two met at Lugalo Barracks early in January 1983. The incriminating declarations or remarks made by the second appellant constituted overt act number 10 in Count 3; whereas those by the ninth C appellant constituted overt act number 12 in Count 3.
Finally, it is the prosecution case that the conspirators had reached the stage of making preparations to execute their coup plot on 8 January 1983. Towards that end, the eighth D appellant deliberately mistuned or mishandled Battery No 2 on 6 January 1983, and the seventh appellant instructed PW8, that is, Staff Sergeant Boniface Temu to interfere with Battery No 2 on the eve of the plot, that is, on 7 January 1983. On that same critical day, the first appellant purchased a number of batteries for use in walkie talkie radios E which were intended for monitoring the coup operations as they were meant to occur on 8 January 1983. In order to leave nothing to chance, the first appellant and the late Mohamed Tamimu alias Martin Tamimu sought assistance from the supernatural world by consulting witchdoctors and requesting them for charms to immunise them against F harm by bullets. The conduct of the eighth appellant in mishandling Battery number 2 on 6 January 1983 constituted overt act number 20 in Count 3; whereas that of the seventh appellant of instructing PW8 to interfere with the Battery constituted overt act number 6 of the same Count 3. And the consultations with the witchdoctors constituted overt act Gnumber 6 of the same Count 3.
The defence side, both at the trial and in this appeal, shares one main position. It is a common contention of the defence side that the prosecution case is a fiction, concocted jointly by the police and the National Security Department of the Government to cover up H the death of Mohamed Tamimu alias Martin Tamimu, which occurred on 6 January 1983. Apart from this common position, each appellant has a unique stand against the prosecution case.
We start with the first appellant. His defence as laid down in cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution and through his defence witness constitutes a general I denial of the prosecution
case and an assertion that the material prosecution witnesses are either liars or A unreliable. There is also an alibi to show that between 31 December 1982 and 5 January 1983 the first appellant was away from Dar es Salaam and had gone to pay condolences to his bereaved mother at Mkaramo in Tanga. He denies travelling to Zanzibar to recruit Albert Ballati. As to the extra-judicial confession which he made Bbefore the magistrate, he claims that it was extorted from him by the police. Finally, he contends that he was denied a fair trial when the learned Jaji Kiongozi made remarks in his ruling at the end of the trial-within-a-trial, concerning the admissibility of the first appellant's extra-judicial confession to the effect that the first appellant was a person C who could choose to tell any lie in order to suit himself. That remark drove the first appellant to choose not to say anything in defence in the main trial.
The second appellant's defence, like that of the first appellant, disclosed through D cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution as well as in the second appellant's unsworn statement from the dock, consists of a general denial of the prosecution case and an assertion that the material prosecution witnesses are either liars or unreliable. There is also an alibi to the effect that during the month of December, the second appellant never visited Arusha as claimed by PW2. E
The third appellant's defence, like that of the first and the second appellants, disclosed through cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution and in the third appellant's unsworn statement from the dock, consists in a general denial of the prosecution case F and an assertion that the material prosecution witnesses are either liars or unreliable. There is also an alibi to the effect that at the time when he is alleged to have participated in conspiratorial meetings at the Drive-In house early in December 1982, he was busy with his studies at the University of Dar es Salaam.
G The defence of the fourth appellant also consists of a general denial of the prosecution case and an innocent admission of visiting the first appellant at the Drive-In house on two occasions, firstly in connection with the death and burial of the first appellant's sister, and secondly in connection with a Christmas party which the first H appellant hosted. He denies visiting Zanzibar with the first appellant to recruit Captain Albert Ballati, but admits going to Zanzibar on several occasions to buy some building materials for the house he was constructing in Dar es Salaam. Finally, he has an alibi to the effect that at the time when he is alleged to have been attending conspiratorial I meetings in early January 1983, he was busy attending to his sick relative, that is, one Oscar.
The defence of the fifth appellant consists of a general denial of the prosecution case, A although he admits meeting PW46, that is, Captain Mohamed Suleiman Mape of the Navy Unit at Kigamboni. He claims, however, that the meeting was an innocent one connected with his request to have Mape assist the fifth appellant to transport some B fridges from Zanzibar in Naval vessels. He also has an alibi to the effect that at the time when he is alleged to have been attending conspiratorial meetings, he was busy either working in his farm at Kitunda where he had a project to build a house, or he was busy with his pigs. As to his extra-judicial confession, he contends that it was extorted from C him by the police and the national security men.
The defence case of the sixth appellant, like that of the other appellants, consists of a general denial of the prosecution case. There is, however, a specific denial of involvement in the recruitment of the fifth and seventh appellants. There is also an alibi D concerning his movements on 31 December 1982 when it is alleged that he visited New Africa Hotel together with Captain Mapunda and Kamando and recruited the seventh appellant. He contends that at the material time he was with his friends celebrating the end of the year at Mwenge Bar in Ukonga. He, of course, makes an innocent admission E of visiting the first appellant at the Drive-In house once in connection with the death and burial of the first appellant's sister.
The defence case of the seventh appellant, like that of the other appellants, consists of a F general denial of the prosecution case. However, he specifically denies recruiting PW8, that is, Staff Sergeant Boniface Temu and asserts that throughout the period when he is alleged to have been involved in conspiratorial activities, he was on leave effective 24 December 1982 until his arrest. During his leave, he was busy attending to G personal matters on the dates when it is claimed he attended conspiratorial meetings.
As to the eighth appellant, it is his defence that he was on leave away from Dar es Salaam and in Iringa, until 30 December 1982. He denies using his car on 1 January 1983 to drive himself and other conspirators to a meeting at the house along Chole H Road. He asserts that his car was undergoing repairs at the time. He further denies attending a conspiratorial meeting on 3 January 1983, and puts forth an alibi to the effect that he spent most of the morning of that day in the company of a relative, namely one Tonny Roussons, ie DW3, who had arrived from Iringa and was in transit taking pupils to I a school at Arusha. He, however, admits visiting Battery
No 2 on 6 January 1983, but not for conspiratorial purposes, but to make personal A checks to enable him to report to a special meeting which was being held that day to discuss range practice matters.
As to the defence case of the ninth appellant, it consists also of a general denial of the prosecution case. He admits being in Dar es Salaam at the time of his arrest, but B asserts that he had come to Dar es Salaam from his usual station at Nachingwea for medical treatment at Lugalo hospital. He also admits meeting PW3, that is, Lieutenant Augustine Pancras Ndejembi with whom he conversed about a disturbance which had been occasioned by a soldier in PW3's unit when that soldier snatched a gun from a C policeman and made derogatory remarks about the Government. He, however, denies making any treasonable declarations or remarks to PW3 in the course of, or after, such conversation.
Let us now consider the merits of these appeals. The form in which the charges against the appellants were filed or presented in the High Court is similar to the one adopted in D the case of Mattaka v R (1). In that case the Court of Appeal of East Africa had occasion to consider the appropriate form of a treason charge and stated at 500:
E `The Criminal Procedure Code makes no specific provision as to the method of laying a charge for treason contrary to section 39(2) and the prosecution followed the English practice of setting out the various overt acts in each count after having first set out the statement and the particulars of the offence. This procedure has not been questioned and was, in our view, correct. It complied with the F provisions of section 135 of the Criminal Procedure Code as it sets out a statement of the specific offence charged and then gave such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged. Section 135 states:
"Every charge or information shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of G the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged."
It also complied with the section 138, and the use of the English procedure in setting out the overt acts after the particulars was justified by section 3(3) of the Code which provides that the procedure and practice observed by the High Court in England, as on 28th September, 1945, shall be followed in cases where the procedure is not prescribed by the Code.'
We were asked, in this appeal, by learned Principal State Attor-
neys for the Republic to give directions as to the propriety of continuing to lay charges in A the form that has been the practice hitherto. We are aware that the Criminal Procedure Code has been replaced by the Criminal Procedure Act 1985, with effect from 1 November 1985 as per Government Notice No 379 of 1985. We are also aware B that the High Court conducted the trial in the present case in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, since the trial commenced and ended before the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 came into effect. We are aware too that the provisions of s 3(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code which required compliance with the procedure and C practice of the High Court in England was repealed by s 7 of Act 26 of 1971. We do not, however, think that this change in the law which freed the criminal courts in this country from the requirement to comply with English procedure and practice, where there is no specific statutory provision to the contrary, necessarily entails a change in the D appropriate form of laying a charge for treason. What it means is that the courts in this country are no longer bound to follow English practice and procedure in a criminal trial and are free to develop a practice and procedure which is in keeping with the circumstances prevailing in this country.
Unfortunately, although we were asked to consider the propriety of continuing with the old practice, the request was made half-heartedly without any local circumstances being pointed out to justify a departure from the old practice. We think that this point was not sufficiently argued before us in this case and it would be unsafe to formulate a new procedure or practice without a sound foundation. We hold that the current practice should continue to be used until such a time in the future when a change is made by this Court or the Legislature. We note that the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 reproduced the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and cannot therefore be construed to have changed the position concerning the form of laying a treason charge.
We next deal with the general complaints which are common to the grounds of appeal submitted by the appellants. The first complaint is that this case is a fictitious one concocted by the Police and the National Security Department of the Government to cover up the fatal shooting of Mohamed Tamimu alias Martin Tamimu on 6 January 1983. We find this contention ridiculous and untenable for four reasons. Firstly, if the Security Department and the Police needed a cover-up they would have picked the obvious cover-up, that is, they would have claimed that the deceased Mohamed Tamimu was killed accidentally while resisting arrest. After all, there
was evidence that the late Mohamed Tamimu had absconded from the army and was A on the run while the army looked for him. Secondly, a cover-up suggesting involvement of some elements of the Army in a coup plot is so sensitive and potentially damaging to national security that no person in his proper mind, and certainly no one in the Police or B National Security Department can conceive such a cover-up, let alone take action to implement it.
Thirdly, the fatal shooting of Mohamed Tamimu alias Martin Tamimu was done by a national security man and not by the police. No convincing reason has been given to C explain why the innocent Police Force would agree to be involved in the cover-up.
Fourthly, there are at least five persons who reported the treasonable conspiracy to the authorities at different times. They are PW2, that is, Lieutenant Iddi Mushi Stambuli, who reported about the middle of December 1982 at Arusha. There is also PW11, that is, D Captain Albert Ballati who reported it in Zanzibar in the third week of December 1982. Also there is PW1, that is, Abdullah Shaban Mhando who reported it in early January 1983, in Dar es Salaam. Similarly, there is PW8, that is, Staff Sergeant Boniface Temu who reported it in Dar es Salaam also in early January 1983. Finally, there is PW3 E Lieutenant Augustine Pancras Ndejembi who reported it in Moshi towards the end of the first week of January 1983. These persons acted independently and at different times and places.
Strong criticisms have been raised in the course of this appeal against these witnesses who claim to have reported the conspiracy to the authorities. Let us examine the main F criticisms. We start with those concerning PW1.
It has been submitted to the effect that PW1 is either a liar or is in any case an unreliable witness. It was argued that it was highly improbable that the first appellant would have G divulged the coup plot to PW1, a mere taxi driver whom the first appellant had hired to drive him in the city. We think that the true position can easily be appreciated by bearing in mind the following factors: PW1 was an old acquaintance of the first appellant; they had been school-mates at Magamba Secondary School in 1965, and PW1 had been H driving the first appellant in his taxi for at least a fortnight before the first appellant divulged to him the coup plot. This association for a fortnight must have renewed and deepened their old acquaintance. Furthermore, the character of the first appellant is very relevant on this point. He is described by a number of witnesses, including PW13, that I is, Sunday Matola; and PW11, that is, Captain Albert Ballati; as well as PW15, that is, Agnes Ballati; and PW39, that is,
Asia Mbwana, as a very talkative and sociable person. Such a talkative and sociable A person, in our view, was likely to divulge the coup plot to an old acquaintance. Furthermore, there is the evidence given by many witnesses, including PW37, that is, Hadija Omari which shows that the first appellant had a weakness for heavy drinking. B The effect of alcohol is well known. It has a tendency to loosen tongues and to remove inhibitions.
Another criticism against PW1 concerns the conspiratorial meetings which are said to have been hosted by the first appellant at house No 80B Drive-In in the early part of December 1982. There was evidence given by PW41, that is, Hope Banyikwa and C PW96, that is, Ibrahim Issa, to the effect that PW1 used to participate in those meetings. It is submitted that if the meetings were conspiratorial as the prosecution contends, then PW1 must have been involved and his evidence has to be treated with great caution. Undoubtedly, this submission has merit. However, it is apparent from the evidence of D PW1 that he was initially uncertain about the information given to him by the first appellant, and he decided to study the movements of the first appellant and his associates before reporting the matter to the authorities. Can such conduct on the part E of PW1 be condemned in a country like ours where it is proclaimed as a part of the national policy that the defence and security of the nation is the responsibility of every Tanzanian and particularly of every patriot? We do not think that the law of this country condemns such patriotic conduct on the part of an individual citizen who decides to F investigate a suspected treason before reporting it to the authorities. Such conduct is commendable and certainly does not, in our criminal law, make him an accomplice or a person with an interest to serve.
It has been argued further that there was an unnecessary delay by PW1 in reporting the G incident to the authorities. Undoubtedly, on the evidence, PW1 made an appointment to report to a senior official of the Intelligence Services, that is, Mr `X' on 15 December 1982. The appointment fell through because PW1's taxi broke down. As the description of the taxi was the only means by which Mr `X' was to identify PW1, it is understandable why PW1 missed the appointment. The following day PW1 flew out of the country to Harare in connection with an earlier commitment of his own. He did not return to Dar es Salaam until 1 January 1983, and managed to contact Mr `X' on 2 January 1983, when he successfully made his report.
It has been argued with some merit that PW1 ought to have
cancelled his trip to Harare until after successfully making his report to Mr `X'. But in A passing judgment on the conduct of PW1, one has to bear in mind that PW1 did not know exactly when the coup plot was fixed to take place. And, furthermore, one has to bear in mind that even the security services did not find it necessary to inform the B President about the coup plot until 6 January 1983, although they had already received a report about such a plot as early as mid-December 1982. Under the circumstances, we do not think that the conduct of PW1 can properly be censured. Like the learned Jaji Kiongozi, we find PW1 a credible and reliable witness.
Let us turn to the main criticisms directed against PW11. They are similar to those C directed against PW1. It has been submitted that it was highly improbable that the first appellant and the fourth appellant would seek to recruit PW11 into the conspiracy without first laying the ground for so doing. We think that there is a reasonable D explanation for the conduct of the first and fourth appellants. Firstly, the coup plotters needed the services of commandos, and PW11 was in charge of commandos. Secondly, the economic hardships which provided the motive power for the coup conspiracy, affected practically everyone both within and outside the army. It was, E therefore, reasonable for the plotters to expect to find sympathy from some elements in the army. Furthermore, Captain Ballati had a bad record in the army, as he had killed a fellow soldier. Such a record made him a likely target for coup plotters.
There is also a criticism about the conduct of PW11 in delaying to report the incident to F the authorities. He was first approached in early December 1982, and he was again contacted by the first and fourth appellants on 12 December 1982, when the coup plot was discussed in detail and his assistance was sought. PW11 did not, however, report the matter to his commanding officer, that is, PW16, Major Hamisi Hemedi Nyuni until 31 December 1982. G
PW11 gave an explanation for his delay in reporting. At first he did not believe the information, and thought that the first and fourth appellants could have been sent by the National Security Department to test the loyalty of Army Commanders at a time of H national economic crisis. Later, when he realised that the plot was real, he decided to get more details about it before reporting the matter to the appropriate authorities. As in the case of PW1, we find this explanation reasonable and convincing.
There was also the additional criticism that PW11 delayed in submitting a written report I requested by his Commanding Officer, PW16. PW11 explained that after he had made his oral report to
PW16, he was assigned other pressing duties which necessitated a delay in his A submitting his written report. There is no evidence to contradict this assertion. There is another explanation which is inherent in the evidence. The crucial purpose of alerting the authorities about the existence of the coup plot was already accomplished by PW11 B making his oral report. The report was transmitted by PW16 to PW17, that is, Sei Bakari Omari, the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence and National Service in the Union Government. The written report was required for a different purpose. PW16 needed it for discussions with commanding officers and other heads of security services in Zanzibar. C Thus the written report was not as urgent as the oral report and PW11 must have known so.
There is another criticism made against PW11, and it is based upon the fact that he was one of those people arrested in the course of the joint exercise conducted by the army, police and national security department. D We do not think that this criticism has merit. Many people were arrested by the police, undoubtedly because the police did not want to leave a stone unturned after they had taken over the investigations from the National Security Department. On our own evaluation of the totality of the evidence, we are satisfied that PW11 is a credible and reliable witness. E
We now turn to PW8, that is, Staff Sergeant Boniface Temu. Five main criticisms were levelled against this witness. It was submitted that it was improbable for PW8 to take part in the mini-meeting at Banana Bar in Ukonga on 4 January 1983, together with commissioned officers, when he was himself a non-commissioned officer. F We think that the behaviour pattern of soldiers under circumstances of a coup plot cannot be judged by the standard behaviour under normal circumstances. A coup plot is an abnormal event and soldiers involved may behave abnormally. It was also submitted that it was improbable for PW8 G to walk all the way from Banana Bar in Ukonga to State House to report the conspiracy instead of using the Shs 200/- which he claims to have been given by the seventh appellant. It is argued that he would have hired a taxi. We do not think that it is improbable for a soldier to decide to walk from Ukonga to State House H and save the money for better personal use, after all, walking is another way in which a soldier may decide to keep himself physically fit. Moreover, we take judicial notice of the fact that the distance from Ukonga to State House is no more than a walking distance for a soldier.
It is also said that PW8 is uncertain about the time he arrived at State House. We do not think that this uncertainty is surprising, in
view of the fact that the witness was testifying about events that took place many years A back.
It was also submitted that it was improbable for PW8 to recall what happened in Banana Bar on 4 January 1983 after taking four beers in addition to another two which PW8 had B previously consumed at the house of the seventh appellant en route to Banana Bar. There is no evidence that PW8 got drunk as a result of drinking these beers. On the contrary, there is evidence that the meeting at Banana Bar in the course of which PW8 consumed the four beers, lasted from 7 or 8 pm to 10.00 or 11.00 pm. That being the position, normal metabolism of the body must have prevent PW8 from getting drunk. C
Finally, it was submitted that the fact that PW8 was one of the persons arrested by the police during the crackdown requires that his testimony be treated with caution. The answer given in respect of a similar submission concerning PW11, also applies here. D On our own evaluation of the totality of the evidence of this witness, we are satisfied that he was a credible witness.
We turn next to the main criticism directed against PW2, that is, Lieutenant Iddi Mushi Stambuli. It has been submitted that it was improbable that the 2nd appellant would E divulge the coup plot to PW2. With due respect to Mr Lakha who made this submission, we do not see any improbability when account is taken of the following factors: On the evidence of PW2, the 2nd appellant was an old friend or acquaintance of PW2. In his unsworn testimony given in his defence in the main trial, the second appellant did not F contradict PW2 on this point. Furthermore, PW2 found the second appellant at a counter in the bar house. It can reasonably be inferred that the second appellant had been drinking in the bar house, unless there is evidence to the contrary. There is no such contrary evidence. We have already pointed out the effect of alcohol. It tends to G loosen tongues and remove inhibitions. Under the circumstances, the second appellant was most likely to divulge the plot to his old friend. On the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we are satisfied that PW2 is a credible and reliable witness.
We turn next to the main criticisms directed against PW3, that is, Lieutenant Augustine H Pancras Ndejembi. It has been submitted that it is highly improbable that the ninth appellant would divulge the coup plot to PW3 who was not closely connected to him. With due respect to Mr Jadeja who made this submission on behalf of the ninth appellant, we can see no improbability in respect of that fact bearing in mind the I following factors: The disclosure was not suddenly made by the ninth appellant to PW3. It was made in the
course of mutual discussions between the ninth appellant and PW3 concerning an A incident of a disgruntled soldier who had snatched a firearm from a policeman, caused a disturbance and made derogatory remarks about the Government. That soldier apparently belonged to PW3's Unit. In the course of that conversation PW3 agreed with B the ninth appellant about the validity of the grievances expressed by the soldier, but disproved the manner in which those grievances were expressed by that particular soldier. The ninth appellant responded by expressing full support for the soldier, and informed PW3 that a coup plot was in the offing for the purpose of remedying the C grievances. We think that the ninth appellant must have felt that he could safely divulge the coup plot to PW3 who recognised the validity of the grievances, notwithstanding PW3's disapproval of the conduct of the disgruntled soldier.
The other main criticism directed against this witness concerns his failure to report the D conspiracy to the authorities and instead reporting it to his father. PW3 explained why he acted as he did. He was not sure who in authority was not involved in the coup plot, after the ninth appellant had informed him that even a Major General was involved in the plot. So PW3 decided to be cautious and decided to report to his father in Moshi, who E was then the Area Commissioner in that part of the country. We think this explanation is reasonable. After all, his father was a man of authority in the Government and could take appropriate measures, consequent upon such a report. The evidence shows that that is F what happened. The report was transmitted to the Regional Commissioner of Kilimanjaro Region and thence to the Prime Minister. On our own evaluation of the totality of the evidence, we are satisfied that PW3 is a credible and reliable witness.
Having found all these relevant material witnesses to be credible and reliable, we are led G to the conclusion that no reasonable person can say that the treasonable conspiracy charged in this case is a fiction concocted by the National Security Department and the Police. We are satisfied that there was a treasonable conspiracy as reported by these witnesses. We are satisfied further, that the evidence adduced by these witnesses is H sufficient to bring into operation the provisions of s 12 of the Evidence Act 1967 which states:
`Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by anyone of such persons I referring to or in execution of or furtherance of their
common intention after the time when such intention was first entertained by anyone of them, is a A relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well as for the purpose of proving the existence of conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.' B
We notice that out of the five persons who reported the conspiracy to the authorities, four of them were soldiers of the TPDF. This demonstrates, in our view, how over the years the TPDF has truly become a peoples' defence force-an army which every Tanzanian of good will is entitled to be proud. C
We come next to another general complaint raised by learned advocates for the appellants. Practically all advocates for the appellants have complained against the attitude of the trial Jaji Kiongozi in accepting the evidence of a number of material prosecution witnesses on the basis that he found no reason why such witnesses should D tell lies against the appellants. Learned advocates for the appellants have submitted, in effect, that the learned Jaji Kiongozi's attitude or approach is wrong, since it appears to proceed on the assumption that witnesses for the prosecution were telling the truth unless the contrary was shown. Both Mr Lakha and Mr Jadeja took the occasion to E express a complaint against what they termed to be a general practice by judges in the courts below and magistrates, of adopting a similar attitude. It is the contention of the advocates for the appellants that such an approach appears to shift the burden of proof in a criminal case. F
This criticism by the learned advocates is directed particularly in respect of the Jaji Kiongozi's handling of the evidence given by PW1, PW39, PW41, PW8, PW9, PW31, PW32, PW34 and PW35. We have considered these criticisms very carefully and we have noticed that learned Jaji Kiongozi treated the absence of apparent reasons for lying G against the appellants as only one of the factors for accepting the evidence of the relevant witnesses. For instance, in handling PW1, Abdallah Mhando, the learned Jaji Kiongozi had this to say at 2229 of the Judge's notes:
H `Abdallah Mhando appeared to be well versed with what he told the court. He was a very straightforward witness who stood firm despite long cross-examination by Mr Lakha. I detected no cunning devices in his evidence and I am satisfied that he was a credible witness. There was no reason why he should have decided to tell lies against Macghee. As for his arrest and detention that does not necessarily make him an untruthful witness.'
It is evident that the learned Jaji Kiongozi gave at least four grounds in favour of this A witness, and one of the grounds was the apparent lack of a reason to tell lies against Macghee. Since one of the major tasks of a trial court is to determine whether a witness is telling the truth, it is logical for such a court to consider whether a witness has reason B for lying against an accused person. This is what the learned Jaji Kiongozi appears to have been doing in the present case.
The same approach can be seen in the handling of the other material witnesses. At 2234 of the Judge's notes, the learned Jaji Kiongozi had this to say: C
`Kadego's defence that he did not know Asia, leave alone visiting the Mkwajuni house is, on the evidence available, not true. Why should Asia and Hope tell lies against him? Why should Lt. Stambuli decide to cook-up such a serious story against him? There was no evidence at all that the D two were enemies. On the contrary, they worked together in Monduli and Rombo Districts. On the totality of the evidence, I am satisfied that Kadego's unsworn defence was a clumsy attempt to evade the consequences of his crime. He apparently did not tell the court why he left the country.' E
At least four grounds are given for accepting the evidence of Asia, Hope and Stambuli. Two of the grounds are common to all these witnesses, that is, the absence of a reason for lying and the failure by Kadego to tell the court why he left the country. There are two F additional grounds in favour of Stambuli. Firstly, the absence of enmity and the fact that he had been working together with Kadego in Rombo District. Similar approach applies to the other relevant prosecution witnesses in respect of whom the criticism has been raised by the defence advocates against the Jaji Kiorgozi's attitude. With due respect, we find the criticism misconceived. G
The other main common ground of complaint against the conduct of the learned Jaji Kiongozi was raised by Mr Jadeja, learned advocate, to the effect that the learned Jaji Kiongozi failed to make adequate summing up of the case to the assessors. It is the H contention of Mr Jadeja that it is mandatory for a trial judge to sum up the case to the assessors before taking their opinions. Mr Jadeja has invited this Court to overrule the decision in the case of Andrea v R (2), where it was held to the effect that the summing up to assessors is a discretion and not a mandatory duty of a trial court. Mr Jadeja has invited us to restore the earlier decision in Milligwa v R (3) where it was held to the effect that there was a mandatory duty
to sum up the case to the assessors before taking their opinions. We are satisfied that A the decision in Andrea's case is the correct one for the reasons given therein, that is, the relevant statutory provision is unambiguous and crystal clear. We cannot interpret the word may used under s 283(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (now s 298(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985) to mean shall. To do so would be to do violence to clear B statutory provisions. We, however, agree with the views expressed in Andrea's case that, although it is not mandatory for the trial judge to sum up the case to the assessors before taking their opinions, it is prudent as a matter of practice so to do, except in the C simplest of cases. The present case was not a simple one, and the learned Jaji Kiongozi properly decided to sum up the case to the assessors before taking their opinions. After all, as already mentioned, the case took about a year to complete.
For the avoidance of doubts, we must point out that it is in any event mandatory upon a D trial judge to take the opinions of the assessors before giving judgment. This is a necessary implication of the provisions of s 248 of the Criminal Procedure Code (now s 265 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985) which requires all criminal trials before the High Court to be with the aid of the assessors.
We have examined the summing up of the learned Jaji Kiongozi. It covers ninety-one E pages of fullscap paper. Although it is true that the learned Jaji Kiongozi did not state every detail and it would have been impossible so to do, it is apparent to us that he summed up the substance or gist of the case for the prosecution and the defence. We F do not think a trial judge is required to state all details of the case in his summing up. If he does so, it would cease to be a summing-up. It is sufficient if he states the substance or gist of the case on both sides in a manner which enables the assessors to give their opinions on the case in general, and on any particular point that the trial judge needs G their opinion. This is what appears to have been done in the present case. For instance, in connection with the seventh appellant in respect of whom Mr Jadeja specifically raised this complaint, the learned Jaji Kiongozi summed up the case at length from pp 1976 to 1978 of the Judge's notes. The gist of the prosecution case against the seventh H appellant appears on those pages, whereas the gist of the seventh appellant's defence is dealt with from pp 2006 to 2008 of the Judge's notes. The summing up deals with both the seventh appellant's general denial of the prosecution case and his alibi. For those reasons, we think that the summing up by the learned Jaji Kiongozi in respect of the I seventh appellant and the other appellants cannot be faulted.
Another main common ground of complaint made by the learned advocate for the A appellants is to the effect that the learned Jaji Kiongozi failed to consider or give adequate consideration to the defence of the appellants. This complaint was raised in the course of the appeal in respect of the first, second, third, fourth, seventh and eighth B appellants. We have carefully considered this ground. It is true that the learned Jaji Kiongozi did not consider each and every detail of the defence of these appellants, predictably because the trial took such a long time. It is apparent, however, that the learned Jaji Kiongozi set out and considered the gist or substance of the defence of C each of these appellants. Can it be said that in so doing the learned Jaji Kiongozi failed to consider any material detail of the defence of the appellants? Since the learned Jaji Kiongozi grasped the gist or substance of the case for the defence, he must necessarily have been aware of the material details from which such gist or substance is derived. D This is borne out clearly from p 2228 to p 2264 of the Judge's notes where the learned Jaji Kiongozi dealt at length with the main criticisms levelled by the defence side against the prosecution case.
One other main common ground of complaint is that the magistrates or the Justice of E the Peace, before whom extra-judicial confessions were made, did not comply with all the formalities required when taking such extra-judicial confessions. Unfortunately, neither Mr Lakha nor any of his learned friends who argued this appeal before us, was certain as to the formalities which apply in this country. The learned attorneys for the F Republic contended that the only relevant formalities are those contained in the Judges' Rules issued by the Judges of the Queen's Bench Division in England. The case of Nayinda s/o Batungwa v R (4) was cited in support of that contention. In that case the following words from a ruling of a Judge of the High Court were cited: G
`The Judges' Rules apply to Tanganyika and therefore before taking a statement from a person in custody the police officer should administer the caution prescribed by Rule 5 of the Judges' Rules....
In my view, a magistrate who is recording an extra-judicial statement should give the person making H the statement the same caution. In fact it is usually done and there has been a High Court Circular some time ago saying that it should be done.'
We agree that Nayinda's case lends support to the proposition that the English Judges' I Rules, at least as they were at the time of that case, were applied to this country by a High Court Circular.
But that is not the end of the problem. Members of this Court, as well as all the learned A advocates and the Principal State Attorneys who appeared in this appeal, were fully aware throughout the hearing of the appeal that there is a current practice concerning the taking of extra-judicial statements in this country which contains rules which are B more elaborate than the Judges' Rules. Unfortunately, no one was able to assist the Court in the course of the appeal to trace the authoritative source of this current practice. The Court had to conduct further research on its own after the conclusion of the appeal, and this necessarily resulted in an unexpected delay in giving this judgment. C This exercise was, however, worthwhile and rewarding. We are now in a position to say that the current local practice can be traced to the year 1963 when the Magistrates' Courts Act 1963 was enacted. The Act contained provisions for the appointment of Justices of the Peace, both ex-officio and appointees of the Minister responsible for D Legal Affairs. Under s 56(2) of the Act the appropriate judicial authority, that is, the Chief Justice, is empowered `to issue instructions not inconsistent with any law for the time being in force for the guidance and control of Justices in the exercise of their powers, functions and duties and every justice shall comply with and obey such instructions'. E
On the authority of the provisions of s 56(2) of the Act, the Chief Justice issued instructions to Justices of the Peace to guide them on, among other things, the manner of taking extra-judicial statements, and these instructions were published in a booklet by F the Government Printer under the Official Seal of the United Republic, and were effective from the date the Act came into force. This booklet entitled `A Guide for Justices of the Peace' contains on pages four to five the relevant instructions hereinafter called `The Chief Justice's Instructions'. The position, therefore, appears to be that since G 1 July 1964, when the Magistrates' Courts Act 1963 came into force, the taking of extra-judicial statements by Justices of the Peace has in this country been regulated by the Chief Justice's Instructions. The Judges' Rules remain applicable to the police only, for whom they were in any case, originally intended.
The question then arises whether these Instructions to Justices of the Peace extend to H the taking of extra-judicial statements by magistrates as well? There is a misconception in this country, and was apparent in the course of these proceedings both in the High Court and in this Court, that a magistrate of every description is an ex-officio Justice of the Peace. That does not appear to be correct. Under the IMagistrates' Court Act 1963, which has been repealed
but substantially reproduced by the Magistrates' Courts Act 1984, the only section which A makes magistrates ex-officio Justices of the Peace is s 52(1)--(now s 58(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1984) which provides:
B `A Primary Court Magistrate shall be a Justice of the Peace for the District for which the Primary Court to which he is assigned is established; and in his capacity as a Justice is hereby assigned to every District Court therein.'
It would seem that only Primary Court Magistrates are ex-officio Justices of the Peace. C The Resident Magistrates and the District Magistrates who took the extra-judicial statements in the present case are not ex-officio Justices of the Peace. Of course, this does not mean that they were not empowered to take extra-judicial statements from persons in custody. They clearly had such powers by virtue of the provisions of s 28 of D the Evidence Act 1967. But are they also bound by the Chief Justice's Instructions when taking extra-judicial statements?
Although the Chief Justice's Instructions specifically refer to Justices of the Peace and make no mention of magistrates, we are satisfied that the instructions were meant to E apply to magistrates also. It is inconceivable, on the grounds of public policy, that there could be two different sets of rules, one applicable to the taking of extra-judicial statements by Justices of the Peace, and another to magistrates when taking such statements. This is because magistrates and Justices of the Peace play the same role F while taking extra-judicial statements. They have, therefore, to be governed by the same rules.
We now come to the crux of the matter. It is indisputable that none of the magistrates who took the extra-judicial statements, which were admitted as exhibits at the trial, fully G complied with the Chief Justice's Instructions. Does this breach of the instructions render the statements inadmissible? We think that the answer to this issue is to be found in the case of Nanyinda s/o Batungwa already cited above. At p 693 of the report it is stated, and we quote: H
`But it must be kept in mind that the Judges' Rules are administrative rules; and breach of them does not automatically result in the exclusion of the statement. The breach is but one of the circumstances, I though the important one, for the trial judge to take into account in deciding whether or not the statement is voluntary.'
Although this decision concerned the Judges' Rules as they then applied to this country, A we are satisfied that the position stated therein applies also to breach of the Chief Justice's Instructions. This means that in as far as the extra-judicial statements of the appellants are concerned, the Court has to consider whether apart from the breach of B the relevant formalities, there are other circumstances which suggest that these extra-judicial statements could have been involuntarily made before the magistrates.
Let us now see whether there are such circumstances relevant to all the appellants who made the extra-judicial statements. It is common ground that the appellants, who made C the extra-judicial statements, had been in police custody shortly before they were taken to the magistrates, and that they either did not complain against treatment by the police, or they expressly informed the magistrates to the effect that they had not been induced by anyone to make the statements. It is also common ground that they were D handed back to the police after they had made the extra-judicial statements. On the basis of this fact, there is a common line of defence by the appellants to the effect that the conduct of the appellants before the magistrates who took the statements was a E mere pretense of freewill so that the particular appellants concerned could avoid a repetition of torture by the police or by the national security men, who had previously tortured them to induce them to confess to the offences charged.
It is part of this line of defence that the appellants concerned ought not to have been F handed back to police custody, but should have been put into judicial custody, that is, put into remand custody by the magistrates after taking the extra-judicial statements.
In our considered opinion, the issue whether or not the particular appellants pretended to be free agents before the magistrates, cannot be resolved in a court of law by other G means except by reference to the conduct and physical appearance of the persons concerned. Only the Almighty God, or perhaps those who claim to have what is known in psychology as Extra Sensory Perception (ESP), can tell directly what goes on in another person's mind without reference to the conduct or physical appearance of that other H person. For most humans, including this Court, what goes on in the minds of another person can reasonably be ascertained only by reference to the conduct or physical appearance of that person.
In the present case, since the appellants who made the extra-judicial statements made it I known to the magistrates that they were free agents, no reasonable tribunal can find otherwise, unless there
was something in their physical appearance or conduct which was inconsistent with A being a free agent; or unless there is cogent evidence to show that they had been tortured while in custody before being taken to the magistrates.
With regard to the submission that the appellants concerned ought not to have been B handed back to police custody, but should have been put in remand custody, we do not see how in law such suspects could have been remanded in custody before they were charged in court. In any case, according to the Chief Justice's instructions above mentioned, the suspects are required to be handed back to police custody. C The lengthy steps which a Justice of the Peace or magistrate is instructed to take contain instruction No 10 which reads: `The accused is returned to police custody.' It is followed by the signature of the Justice (or the magistrate) concerned, as the case may be.
Let us now try to see whether there are any unique circumstances which may suggest D that any of the appellants who made the extra-judicial statements might have done so involuntarily. In the case of the first appellant, it is common ground that he informed the magistrate that he had not been tortured. On the evidence, there is nothing in his E conduct or physical appearance to belie this information, since the five old scars which he had on his body, were, according to his testimony, sustained by him about two-and-a-half years before this matter. Those scars, therefore, have no relevance to this case. There is, of course, the suggestion that the magistrate did not sufficiently F identify himself as such to the first appellant. This suggestion, however, is contradicted by the record. For instance, it is quite clear on pp 808, 810, 837 and 838 of the Judge's notes, that the resident magistrate identified himself as a magistrate and the first appellant understood him to be such.
As to the allegation that the first appellant was tortured while in police custody, the G learned Jaji Kiongozi specifically addressed his mind to it and stated in his ruling at the end of the trial that:
`Having examined with the closest care and attention all the circumstances in which the accused gave his confession, I am satisfied that Superintendent Siame, Mr Y and Mr H told the truth when they H said that they did not torture the accused, so as to induce him to make a statement before the Justice of the Peace.'
With due respect to Mr Lakha, learned advocate, we find nothing in his written or oral submission which can fault the trial Jaji Kiongozi for accepting the evidence of I Superintendent Siame, or Mr `Y'
Or Mr `H' on this point. Moreover, we can find nothing on record to enable us to come to A a conclusion which is different from that arrived at by the learned Jaji Kiongozi, regarding these witnesses on this issue. We are thus led to hold that the extra-judicial statement made by the first appellant was a voluntary one and therefore was properly admitted as evidence in this case. B
What about the circumstances under which the fifth appellant made his extra-judicial statement? It is common ground that he also informed the magistrate to the effect that he had not been tortured while in police custody. Was there anything in his conduct or C physical appearance to suggest the contrary? We can see none. There is of course the suggestion made in his evidence given in the trial within the trial that he could not have told the magistrate otherwise because Mr Masolwa, that is, PW71, and his team were present when the magistrate inquired about the possibility of torture. We do not think that D the fifth appellant's evidence on this point is cogent, because this suggestion was not put forward to Mr Masolwa or the magistrate under cross-examination. The suggestion seems to be an afterthought on the part of the fifth appellant.
The fifth appellant also testified in his trial within the trial that he was given notes by E PW71 to use and that he actually used such notes while giving his extra-judicial statement to the magistrate. This evidence was, however, contradicted not only by PW71 but also by the magistrate in question. Part of the fifth appellant's evidence in his F trial within the trial is to the effect that he was tortured by the police and the national security men while under police custody being taken to the magistrate. The torture was applied to his private parts so severely that those organs from which he had been suffering from a venereal disease got swollen up. This evidence, however, is G contradicted by the evidence of PW75, a medical assistant who examined and treated the fifth appellant in connection with his venereal disease and a fever. The medical assistant noticed nothing wrong with the fifth appellant's private parts apart from this venereal disease which had nothing to do with this matter.
The fifth appellant, while giving his evidence in his defence in the main trial before the H court including the assessors, repeated his assertion about the torture. This assertion was, however, made in unsworn testimony given by the fifth appellant and was therefore not open to cross-examination by the prosecution. It was quite improper on the part of I the fifth appellant to repeat this assertion before the assessors when he was not prepared to give evidence on
oath and be cross-examined to test the veracit
